Kelp DAO事件三种处理路径及潜在坏账分析

Three Handling Paths and Potential Bad Debt Analysis of the Kelp DAO Incident

BroadChainBroadChain04/20/2026, 09:46 AM
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Summary

BroadChain learned that at 09:46 on April 20, according to PANews, DefiLlama founder 0xngmi analyzed and pointed out that Kelp DAO faces three handling options in the rsETH incident. Option one is for all users to share the loss, with users facing an 18.5% impairment. If this option is adopted, there are currently about 666,000 rsETH across all Aave deployments. Assuming all chain positions are at a 95% liquidation LTV, their net value would be wiped out, generating approximately $216 million in bad debt. Among this, Umbrella ETH could cover $55 million, the Aave treasury could cover $85 million, leaving a $76 million shortfall.

BroadChain has learned that at 09:46 on April 20, according to PANews, DefiLlama founder 0xngmi analyzed that Kelp DAO faces three handling options in the rsETH incident. Option one is for all users to share the losses, with users facing an 18.5% impairment. Under this option, there are approximately 666,000 rsETH in all current Aave deployments. Assuming all chain positions are at a 95% liquidation LTV, their net value would be wiped out, resulting in approximately $216 million in bad debt. Among this, Umbrella ETH can cover $55 million, the Aave treasury can cover $85 million, leaving a $76 million gap that needs to be filled through loans or selling $51 million worth of AAVE tokens. Option two is to concentrate the losses on L2 rsETH holders, with Aave using the treasury to rescue mainnet users but abandoning the L2 market. Under this option, there is approximately $359 million in rsETH supply on Aave. If all are borrowed at maximum LTV, it would result in $341 million in bad debt, which Umbrella cannot cover, and Aave would have to bear it alone. Option three is to use a pre-attack snapshot to return assets to holders, compensating only for the $124 million (mainnet) and $18 million (Arbitrum) borrowed by the hacker. After deducting Umbrella coverage, the loss would be about $91 million. However, due to the complexity of fund flows after the attack and the inability of the protocol pool to distinguish depositors, implementation is extremely difficult.